U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-Ct) Holds a Hearing On U.N. Sanctions

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U.S. Representative Christopher Shays (R-Ct) Holds a Hearing On U.N. Sanctions

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM: SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, EMERGING THREATS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOLDS A HEARING ON U.N. SANCTIONS

MAY 2, 2006

SPEAKERS: U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER SHAYS (R-CT) CHAIRMAN U.S. REPRESENTATIVE KENNY MARCHANT (R-TX) VICE CHAIRMAN U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DAN BURTON (R-IN) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN (R-FL) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN M. MCHUGH (R-NY) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEVEN C. LATOURETTE (R-OH) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TODD RUSSELL PLATTS (R-PA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOHN J. DUNCAN JR. (R-TN) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JON C. PORTER (R-NV) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES W. DENT (R-PA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS M. DAVIS III (R-VA) EX OFFICIO

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE DENNIS J. KUCINICH (D-OH) RANKING MEMBER U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TOM LANTOS (D-CA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CAROLYN B. MALONEY (D-NY) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRIS VAN HOLLEN (D-MD) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LINDA T. SANCHEZ (D-CA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE C.A. "DUTCH" RUPPERSBERGER (D-MD) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE STEPHEN F. LYNCH (D-MA) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN HIGGINS (D-NY) U.S. REPRESENTATIVE HENRY WAXMAN (D-CA) EX OFFICIO

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BERNARD SANDERS (I-VT)

WITNESSES: JOHN BOLTON, U.S. PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE U.N.

JOSEPH CHRISTOFF, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

CARNE ROSS, DIRECTOR, INDEPENDENT DIPLOMAT

GEORGE LOPEZ, SENIOR FELLOW, PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, THE JOAN KROC INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE STUDIES, UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME

[*] SHAYS: A quorum being present, the Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations hearing entitled, "U.N. Sanctions after Oil-for-Food: Still a Viable Diplomatic Tool?" is called to order.

There's no guarantee United Nations management reforms will ensure future sanctions succeed. But the lack of management reforms will certainly guarantee they fail.

U.N. Security Council Resolution 661 imposed comprehensive sanctions on Iraq after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Over the next four years, proposals to ease, rather than enforce, the sanctions dominated the deliberations of the 661 committee composed of all permanent and rotating Security Council members.

From its inception in 1996, the United Nations oil-for-food program was susceptible to political manipulation and financial corruption. The program lacked United Nations oversight and accountability, and trusted Saddam Hussein with sovereign control over billions of dollars of oil sales and commodity purchases. This situation, of course, invited elicit premiums, kickbacks and other forms of corruption.

How was a well-intentioned program designed and administered by the world's preeminent multinational organization so systematically and thoroughly pillaged?

The answers emerging from investigations from the Volcker commission, the Government Accountability Office and from this committee and other congressional committees point to a debilitating combination of political paralysis and the lack of oversight that metastasized behind a veil of official secrecy.

Two years ago, this subcommittee first heard how Saddam Hussein's regime manipulated the oil-for-food program. Our second hearing addressed problems the oil-for-food contract inspectors faced in dealing with both Hussein regime and the United Nations. The third dealt with internal deliberations at the U.N. and willful ignorance of the Security Council members toward the corruption taking place.

At today's hearing, we will consider implications of this scandal for future U.N. sanctions.

SHAYS: In the wake of the oil-for-food program scandal, we ask how can the U.N. be expected to properly administer future sanctions against states such as Sudan or Iran which commit vicious crimes against their own people and threaten international peace and stability?

Sanctions are essential measures used to maintain or restore international peace and security. Sanctions are an alternative to armed conflict. The penalty or price applied to a state must outweigh the advantages of wrongful behavior and lead the target state to rescind its behavior.

No sanction program is effective unless its objectives are widely shared and supported among key U.N. member states. And we have learned from the oil-for-food scandal, oversight of any sanction program is absolutely essential.

The GAO noted the U.N. Office of Internal Oversight Services, the inspector general at t...

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